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Dieter: You've Got Mail: FBI Hacking in United States v Lough and Why It

YOU’VE GOT MAIL: FBI HACKING IN UNITED STATES v. LOUGH AND
WHY IT IS A FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH
RYAN DIETER*
“[This] can lead to large-scale privacy and civil liberties abuses at home
and abroad.”1
I.

PLUGGING IN: REVISITING THE DEBATE BETWEEN SECURITY AND PRIVACY

The Inland Regional Center is a facility for those with developmental
disabilities.2 Until December 2, 2015, most people had never heard of the San
Bernardino facility, but on that date, it became the infamous location of one of
the most memorable and devastating terrorist attacks on American soil.3 The
shooters, Syed Farook and his wife Tashfeen Malik, killed fourteen people and
wounded twenty-two others.4 Perhaps even more well-known than the actual
attack was the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) extremely public battle
with Apple over access to Farook’s iPhone.5
After seizing the smartphone, the FBI realized that Farook had secured the

* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; B.A.
2016, The Pennsylvania State University. This Note is dedicated to my family, friends, and
all those who have supported me throughout my life. I would also like to extend a special
thanks to everyone on the Villanova Law Review for all of their contributions.
1. See Ellen Nakashima, This Is How the Government Is Catching People Who Use
POST
(Jan.
21,
2016),
Child
Porn
Sites,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-the-government-is-usingmalware-to-ensnare-child-porn-users/2016/01/21/fb8ab5f8-bec0-11e5-83d442e3bceea902_story.html?utm_term=.aa634855ec1e [https://perma.cc/HZ8S-7DRY] (quoting
Ahmed Ghappour, professor at University of California’s Hastings College of the Law).
2. See Mark Schone et al., San Bernardino Shooting: What Is the Inland Regional
Center?, NBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/sToryline/san-bernardinoshooting/san-bernardino-shooting-what-inland-regional-center-n473016
[https://perma.cc/TWT8-NHDH] (“The site of a deadly mass shooting in San Bernardino,
California . . . had just held a holiday party a day before the shots rang out.”).
3. See Wm. Robert Johnston, Terrorist Attacks and Related Incidents in the United
States, JOHNSTON’S ARCHIVE, http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/wrjp255a.html
[https://perma.cc/CHK2-L8VE] (last visited Mar. 24, 2018) (providing compilation of all
incidents of terror in the United States since 1865); Everything We Know About the San
Bernardino Terror Attack Investigation, THE SUN (Nov. 27, 2016, 04:05 PM),
http://www.sbsun.com/2016/11/27/everything-we-know-about-the-san-bernardino-terrorattack-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/5PYX-3C94] [hereinafter Everything We Know] (“The
Dec. 2 shooting at the Inland Regional Center . . . saw a massive response from law
enforcement agencies from throughout the region, along with the FBI.”).
4. See Everything We Know, supra note 3 (“[The shooters] died in a gunfight with law
enforcement . . . about five hours after the massacre.”). Farook was a United States citizen,
but his wife came to the country in 2014. See id. The only evidence of their radical views
was “a Facebook statement in support of terrorist organization Islamic State around the time
of the shootings.” See id. “The couple had drawn a flat line with only a violent spike at the
end for investigators to pick apart.” Id.
5. See id. (stating FBI seized “pipe bombs, bomb-making materials and thousands of
rounds of ammunition” during a warranted search of the shooters’ home). The cellphone was
found in Farook’s mother’s vehicle. See id.
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device using a passcode.6 Consequently, if the agents entered the wrong code
too many times, the data on the iPhone would be permanently erased.7 Rather
than press their luck, the FBI agents working the case obtained an order from a
federal magistrate judge instructing Apple to construct a “backdoor entry” into
the iPhone via new software.8 Apple’s Chief Executive Officer, Tim Cook,
referred to the federal order as “chilling,” comparing the potential software to “a
master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of locks.”9 The
technology giant, as well as many other private citizens and commentators,
worried that if this unprecedented power were given to the FBI, there would be
nothing to stop it from using the software to access countless other phones.10
Nevertheless due to third party intervention, the FBI was able to unlock the
phone before the data was destroyed.11
Although debate surrounding the above case was fierce, it represented but
one battle in the struggle between the government’s interest in effective and
efficient law enforcement and the common interest in privacy.12 Indeed, the
framers of the United States Constitution anticipated this friction when they
penned the Fourth Amendment’s protections against governmental intrusions.13
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is well defined for searches occurring in the
physical world.14 However, the rules for electronic searches are far less
6. See id. (explaining that Farook had private passcode for iPhone).
7. See id. (“[A]gents were concerned they would permanently lose any data on [the
phone] if they failed too many times to open it.”). The phone was issued to Farook by his
employer, San Bernardino County. See id. However, the passcode he used to secure the
phone had not been shared with county officials. See id. With the only person who knew the
code dead, the FBI could only make guesses at the correct passcode. See id.
8. See id. (“[A] federal magistrate in Riverside [issued] an order in February for Apple
engineers to develop software for a backdoor entry to the phone.”).
9. See Arjun Kharpal, Apple vs FBI: All You Need to Know, CNBC (Mar. 29, 2016,
06:34
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/29/apple-vs-fbi-all-you-need-to-know.html
[http://perma.cc/K94G-GY6X] (“Cook’s argument was that if the FBI could access this
iPhone, nothing would stop them from doing it to many others.”).
10. See id. (explaining that data privacy is a sensitive subject after Edward Snowden
revealed the extent of surveillance conducted by government).
11. See id. (explaining FBI has refused to reveal identity of third party or method used
to unlock phone, but some reported the secret partner was Israeli firm called Cellebrite).
12. See id. (“The case marked one of the highest-profile clashes in the debate over
encryption and data privacy between the government and a technology company.”). The
government makes a compelling case that encryption methods used in today’s technology
makes it harder for it to investigate and solve cases. See id. Private companies retorted,
stating, “encryption is key to protecting user data from hackers.” See id.
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . . .”).
14. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (permitting law enforcement
to search vehicles incident to arrest); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001) (holding
that police may not use thermal camera to look inside suspect’s home without warrant);
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 565 (1991) (holding that police may search vehicle
without warrant, so long as they have probable cause to believe evidence of crime will be
found within); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (holding that there was no violation
of Fourth Amendment when police looked down into suspect’s fenced-in backyard from
helicopter); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 35 (1988) (holding that act of combing
through suspect’s trash on curb is not search under Fourth Amendment); Chimel v. California,

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss6/5

2

Dieter: You've Got Mail: FBI Hacking in United States v Lough and Why It

2018]

YOU’VE GOT MAIL

103

refined.15
Compounding this disparity is the fact that the rapid advancement of
investigative technology has granted the FBI the capability to implant what
amounts to malware, otherwise known as dangerous software, on a suspect’s
computer for the purpose of obtaining identifying information about the
suspect.16 This new tactic, known as a network investigative technique (NIT),
presented the question at issue in United States v. Lough:17 whether the NIT a
Fourth Amendment “search.”18 Courts across the country, including Lough,
have answered this question in the negative simultaneous with the rise in NIT
has an investigative technique.19 Far fewer cases have found that the NIT is a
Fourth Amendment search.20 Regardless of the varied dispositions, not a single
court addressing the issue has completed the search analysis prescribed in the
Supreme Court’s most important search and seizure case, United States v.
Jones.21 In Jones, the Court stated that, contrary to previous opinions, whether
the government had “physically intruded” into the defendant’s privacy is still a
crucial part of the determination of whether a Fourth Amendment search had
395 U.S. 752, 766–67 (1969) (explaining that police are allowed to conduct limited search
incident to arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968) (holding that under certain
circumstances police may stop and frisk suspect).
15. Just three years ago, in a case determining whether police may search the data on a
cell phone, the Supreme Court recognized a difference between a cell phone and a cigarette
carton as a container of information. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2478–79 (2014)
(holding that although cellphones and cigarette cartons can both feasibly hold information, the
volume of data a cellphone is capable of storing distinguishes it from all other containers).
16. See United States v. Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 770 (N.D. W. Va. 2016) (presenting
issue of FBI utilizing malware to force suspect’s computer to send suspect’s IP address and
other information to law enforcement agents).
17. 221 F. Supp. 3d 770 (N.D. W. Va. 2016).
18. See id. at 774–75 (stating that initial question in deciding whether to suppress
evidence is whether a Fourth Amendment search was conducted).
19. See id. at 775–76 (holding that because defendant had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in information taken by malware, NIT was not a search); see also United States v.
Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920, 933 (W.D. Ark. 2016) (“[T]he FBI in the instant case was under no
legal obligation to obtain a search warrant . . . as IP addresses are unlikely to be entitled to the
same Fourth Amendment protections as are the substantive contents of users’ computers.”);
United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC2016, 2016 WL 4208436, at *4
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016) (proclaiming that NIT was not search); United States v. Eure, No.
2:16cr43, 2016 WL 4059663, at *9 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2016) (holding that “searches and
seizures perform[ed] pursuant to the NIT did not violate Fourth Amendment”); United States
v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 444 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (holding that defendant’s computer was
not searched because the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in their IP
address).
20. See United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 530 (E.D. Va. 2016) (finding that
because government “invaded the contents of the computer” NIT constituted Fourth
Amendment search); see also United States v. Ammons, 207 F. Supp. 3d 732, 739 (W.D. Ky.
2016) (citing United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that
because defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in a computer, rather than a IP
address, government’s intrusion was a search)); United States v. Torres, No. 5:16-CR-285DAE, 2016 WL 4821223, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2016) (holding that installation of code
without permission is search).
21. 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012) (stating that test for whether search has occurred does not
end with “reasonable expectation of privacy” examination, but also must include “physical
intrusion” test).
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occurred.22
This Note argues that because the Lough court and its many companions
overlooked the Jones case, they erred in concluding the NIT was not a Fourth
Amendment search.23 First, this Note will provide a brief overview of the
technological aspects that seem to confuse courts.24 Second, this Note will
examine the history of Fourth Amendment searches.25 Then, this Note will
summarize the common nucleus of facts that led to Lough and describe the
court’s reasoning for its conclusion.26 Finally, this Note will demonstrate that
under a complete Fourth Amendment analysis, the FBI’s use of the NIT
constituted a search.27
II. READING THE INSTRUCTIONS: COMPUTER SCIENCE 101 AND THE
EVOLUTION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES
In her concurrence in Jones, Justice Sotomayor suggested that current law
regarding searches may not be able to keep pace with the rate of technological
advancement.28 She noted further that expectations of privacy deemed
“reasonable” by society may change with the amount of information publicly
available about a person via the Internet.29 Indeed, confusion amongst judges
regarding how technology works has led to some incongruous analogies
attempting to reconcile the physical world with the digital world.30
A. Welcome to Class: A Brief Overview of Computer Science Concepts
Cases like Lough require a great deal of technical literacy to understand the
22. See id. (stating that “reasonable expectation of privacy” determination
supplemented rather than replaced the “physical intrusion” inquiry).
23. See infra notes 146-87 and accompanying text for critical analysis of Lough
decision.
24. See infra notes 29–59 and accompanying text for background information on
relevant computer science concepts.
25. See infra notes 60–105 and accompanying text for overview on the history of
Fourth Amendment searches.
26. See infra notes 106–25 and accompanying text for information about the facts of
Lough.
27. See infra notes 146–87 and accompanying text for critical analysis of Lough
decision.
28. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”).
29. See id. at 418 (“I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the
warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the
last week, or month, or year. But whatever the societal expectations, they can attain
constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat
secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy.”).
30. See id. at 420 (Alito, J., dissenting) (comparing GPS tracker to law enforcement
agent hiding somewhere inside vehicle to track its movements); see also United States v.
Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 770, 777 (N.D. W. Va. 2016) (citing United States v. Jean, 207 F.
Supp. 3d 920, 938 (W.D. Ark. 2016)) (agreeing with courts that have likening method
computers use to connect to various websites to act of traveling via car to location of server
housing site).
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issue, and some courts have proven better than others at describing the
technology involved.31 One key technological term to understand before diving
into Lough is Internet Protocol Address (IP address).32 An IP address is an
identification number that allows devices to connect to the Internet.33 A house,
business, or other physical property has a street address; similarly, each device
capable of accessing the Internet has its own specific IP address.34 A post office
cannot deliver mail if the exact receiving address is not provided.35 Similarly,
in the digital world, data cannot be transmitted over the Internet without
knowing which IP address to send the information to.36
The average Internet user connects to the Internet via an internet service
provider (ISP), which then assigns the user an IP address.37 Along with the ISP,
website administrators can view the IP addresses of all individuals who visit
their sites, however, only the ISP can link the IP address to a person’s true
identity.38 At least one court has looked into the privacy rights individuals have
in their IP addresses.39 For instance, even in a case where the FBI had
administrative control of a website and could see the IP addresses visiting a
child pornography website, it was only able to obtain the suspects’ names by
going to the ISP.40
In child pornography cases it is common for users of illicit sites to hide
their IP addresses from child pornography websites using software called The
31. See Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 924–27 (explaining, in great detail, technology used
to hide child pornography websites on Internet and FBI’s NIT process).
32. See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 775 (determining that individual does not have
reasonable expectation of privacy in an IP address because it has been shared with a third
party).
33. See Tim Fisher, What Is an IP Address, LIFEWIRE (Jun. 1, 2017),
https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-an-ip-address-2625920
[https://perma.cc/MSA4-ZR8C]
(“Having an IP address allows a device to communicate with other devices over an IP-based
network like the internet.”).
34. See id. (“[D]evices on a network are differentiated from one another through IP
addresses.”).
35. See id. (“It’s not enough to just put a package with [the recipient’s] name on it
through the mail and expect it to reach him.”).
36. See id. (“[I]nstead of using a phone book to look up someone’s name to find their
physical address, your computer uses DNS servers to look up a hostname to find its IP
address.”). A Domain Name System (DNS) server is a database of IP addresses and their
common names (i.e. “google.com”). See Tim Fisher, What Is a DNS Server?, Lifewire (Jan.
16, 2018), https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-a-dns-server-2625854 [https://perma.cc/ZPF2FJHX] (explaining DNS servers and their relation to IP addresses).
37. See United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 563 (3d. Cir. 2010) (explaining process
of customers connecting to the internet). ISPs only keep information on customers’ assigned
IP address for a short window of time because many ISPs change their customers’ IP
addresses over time. See id. (“Depending on the ISP, a customer’s IP address can change
each time he logs on to the internet.”).
38. See id. (“IP addresses are also conveyed to websites that an internet user visits . . . .
However, site administrators do not possess information linking a given IP address to a
particular person.”).
39. See id. at 573 (considering whether defendant had reasonable expectation of
privacy in his IP addresses).
40. See id. (explaining that FBI was only able to learn defendant’s legal name by
gaining administrative access to site, monitoring IP addresses, and asking ISP to match IP
addresses with associated users).
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Onion Router (Tor).41 Tor’s name is a nod to the way in which it cloaks users’
IP addresses; it “bounces” a user through a network of other Tor users in order
to create “layers” of protection.42 The protection takes away a website’s ability
to read a user’s IP address, only revealing that someone is using Tor to visit the
website.43 Each layer in the chain only knows the prior IP address and the next
layer to send it to.44 As a result, no single layer knows both the real IP address
and the target webpage.45
Although Tor is commonly used for nefarious purposes, it originated as a
way for the United States military to mask its confidential communications.46
For Tor to be effective, these confidential communications needed to be hidden
amongst other, non-military users.47 This is why Tor is free to download for
anyone who wishes to utilize it.48 Because of its open availability, many use
Tor for truly innocent and even humanitarian purposes.49 Nevertheless, it is
also an attractive piece of software for criminals who have created a “Dark
Web” filled with child pornography websites and illicit drug markets.50
41. See United States v. Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 770, 772 (N.D. W. Va. 2016) (stating
that Tor allows criminals to interact with child pornography websites without detection by law
enforcement by “hiding their IP addresses and identities”); see generally, Abbott, Hiding from
Prying Eyes, OR. ST. B. BULL. 32 (2008)(concluding that resources like Tor can be used for
criminal purposes and “heroic” purposes).
42. See NPR Staff, Going Dark: The Internet Behind the Internet, NPR: ALL THINGS
CONSIDERED
(May
25,
2014,
06:54
PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/05/25/315821415/going-dark-theinternet-behind-the-internet [https://perma.cc/TF9J-24YC] (“[T]he onion refers to the layers
you go through to disguise your identity.”).
43. See id. (explaining that when using Tor, the location given to website will change
to a different node in the Tor network). For instance, a user in Washington, D.C. could send
internet traffic across the globe and “the website that [a user visits] will see that someone in
Russia is visiting, not [the user] in D.C.” See id.
44. See
Tor:
Overview,
THE
TOR
PROJECT,
https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en [https://perma.cc/AWM7-HFY5] (last
visited Sept. 1, 2017) (“No individual relay ever knows the complete path that a data packet
has taken.”).
45. See Tor: Overview, supra note 44 (“Because each relay sees no more than one hop
in the circuit, neither an eavesdropper nor a compromised relay can . . . link the connection’s
source and destination.”). Tor keeps a given circuit open for only ten minutes, then a new
circuit is created to ensure anonymity. See id. Tor’s process has been likened to a skilled
getaway driver escaping a “tail” by police. See id.
46. See NPR Staff, supra note 42 (stating that Tor was developed at Naval Research
Laboratory).
47. See id. (“[B]y opening up this system to everyone, different groups of people can
hide in a big crowd of anonymous Tor users.”).
48. See United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920, 924 (W.D. Ark. 2016) (describing
Tor as free software used to hide IP addresses from detection); Tor: Overview, supra note 44
(explaining that the more users Tor has, the more hidden each user can be).
49. See NPR Staff, supra note 42 (explaining that Tor is used by “human rights
activists, journalists, military, law enforcement,” political dissidents, and “normal people”).
Indeed, due to its unique security, Tor saw a dramatic increase in its usage during the Arab
Spring. See id. Additionally, because of its message of protecting civil liberties, Tor saw an
increase after Edward Snowden’s whistleblowing about the extent of the National Security
Agency’s (NSA) surveillance program. See id.
50. See Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 925 (explaining that child pornography websites are
frequently found in Tor’s “hidden services” as its users feel anonymous).
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To combat Tor’s masking of IP addresses, the FBI “ran an end-around” and
created a piece of software that would force a suspect’s computer to reveal its
IP address.51 To combat Tor’s masking of IP addresses, the FBI “ran an endaround” and created the NIT software, which is essentially malware, to force a
suspect’s computer to reveal its IP address.52 Malware is an abbreviation for
“malicious software” and is considered to be “any program or file that is
harmful to a computer user.”53 These programs can be designed or coded to do
anything from steal sensitive data to completely change the core functions of a
computer.54 Frequently, malware is designed to download to users’ computers,
without their knowledge or permission, after they have visited a malwareinfected site.55 Because of the negative connotation associated with the term
malware, the FBI objected to the labeling of the NIT as such.56 However, the
term is the most apt description of the software used in Lough.57
B. Search History: The Evolution of Fourth Amendment Search Analysis
The United States Supreme Court has issued numerous opinions defining a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment.58 Perhaps no case has played a greater
role in shaping this definition than Katz v. United States.59 In Katz, the Court
detailed a two-part reasonable expectation test for determining whether an

51. See United States v. Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 770, 773 (2016) (N.D. W. Va. 2016)
(explaining that NIT software triggered suspect’s computer to reveal IP address and other
identifying information to FBI).
52. See Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 927–28 (“The FBI was able to cause the user’s
computer to report the identifying information by exploiting a defective window in the TOR
browser [sic], through which it ran what amounts to malware on the user’s computer, with the
objective being to override the TOR browser’s and the user’s computer security settings, and
then ‘cause’ the user’s computer to return discrete, content-neutral items of identifying
information back to the FBI.”).
53.
See Margaret Rouse, Malware (Malicious Software), TECHTARGET,
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/malware [https://perma.cc/EP63-B6G8] (last
visited Apr. 11, 2018) (providing basic definition of malware).
54. See id. (“These malicious programs can perform a variety of functions, including
stealing, encrypting or deleting sensitive data, altering or hijacking core computing functions
and monitoring users’ computer activity without their permission.”). Examples of malware
include viruses, Trojan horses, spyware, and Ransomware. See id.
55. See id. (describing the different methods of spreading malware; the method
described here is called “drive-by download”).
56. See Jean, 207 F.Supp.3d at 927 n.7 (“Agent Aflin objects to describing the NIT as
malware, because the term has a derogatory connotation.”).
57. See Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 927 n.7 (“[W]hen used as a term of art to explain an
ethical hacking technique used by law enforcement, the term malware is descriptive of the
NIT used here.”); see also United States v. Lough, 221 F.Supp.3d 770, 772-74 (describing the
NIT used by the FBI).
58. See supra note 13 and accompanying text for examples of Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
59. 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see Fabio Arcila, Jr., GPS Tracking out of Fourth Amendment
Dead Ends: United States v. Jones and the Katz Conundrum, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1, 17 (2012)
(stating that Jones is potentially the most important Fourth Amendment opinion since Katz,
thereby recognizing Katz as most important Fourth Amendment case in forty years prior to
Jones).
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activity constituted a Fourth Amendment search.60 Nevertheless, after decades
of application, the Court reconsidered its early jurisprudence and modified the
search analysis to include not only the Katz test, but also a test based on a
physical intrusion by law enforcement.61
1.

The “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test

Prior to Katz, the governing rule regarding the Fourth Amendment stated
that a search occurred only when a government agent physically intruded into a
“constitutionally protected area.”62 The Court had made clear that “[w]hat a
person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not subject to Fourth Amendment
protection.”63 This became an issue in Katz, where the FBI had been
investigating the defendant for his participation in a gambling ring.64 The FBI
affixed a listening device to the outside of a public telephone booth to
eavesdrop on the defendant’s conversation.65 Because the device never actually
went inside the booth, the FBI’s activity would not have constituted a Fourth
Amendment search under the physical intrusion analysis.66
In shaping a new rule, the Court concluded in Katz that it did not matter
where a search took place, but only whether a person expected that his or her
information would not be made public.67 Defined more clearly in Justice

60. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353–59 (holding that the “trespass” doctrine for Fourth
Amendment searches is no longer controlling and creating instead a test based on expectation
of privacy).
61. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (“Fourth Amendment rights
do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”). Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, stated
that the Katz test did not supplant the physical intrusion test, but merely supplemented it. See
id. at 406–07.
62. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (stating that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places”). The parties in Katz spent a large amount of their briefs debating whether a phone
booth was a “constitutionally protected area.” See id. Rather than examining where a
particular search took place, the Court decided that when considering whether a search had
occurred, the important factor to consider is whether an individual intended to expose that
information to the public. See id.
63. See id. (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966); United States v.
Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)).
64. See id. at 348 (explaining that Katz was under investigation for “transmitting
wagering information” using a public telephone booth).
65. See id. at 348 (explaining that device was used to listen to and record numerous
calls by the defendant in order to obtain evidence of his criminal activity). The defendant
used the phone to “transmit[] wagering information”; which meant he was caught illegally
gambling using the phone booth. See id. Technically, the defendant’s actions exposed him to
the public. See id. Not only was the defendant using a public phone booth, but the booth was
partially made of glass, therefore anyone walking past would see he made calls inside. See id.
at 351. However, the Court stated that although he could be seen publicly, that when the door
of the booth shut, it signaled the defendant’s expectation that the conversation he had on the
phone was meant to be private. See id. at 352–53.
66. See id. at 353 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible
items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements overheard without any ‘technical
trespass under . . . local property law.’” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,
511 (1961))). “[T]he surveillance technique . . . employed involved no physical penetration of
the telephone booth from which petitioner placed his calls.” Id. at 352.
67. See id. at 352 (“One who occupies [a phone booth], shuts the door behind him, and
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Harlan’s concurrence, this new test featured two prongs.68 The first prong of
the test considers whether an individual had a subjective expectation of
privacy.69 The second prong of the test, the objective prong, asks whether this
subjective expectation was one that society is willing to accept.70 Therefore, an
individual with a reasonable expectation of privacy cannot be subject to a
warrantless or unreasonable search absent exigent circumstances.71
As the Katz test has been developed and applied over time, the Court has
identified certain types of information that lack any reasonable expectation of
privacy.72 One such circumstance is the “third party doctrine.”73 Under this
rule, any information conveyed to or shared with a third party loses any
expectation of privacy it once had.74
Of particular importance to this area is the way in which the third party
doctrine interacts with IP addresses.75 Because an IP address is given to a user
by an ISP, that information is, by necessity, shared with a third party.76 Under
pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he
utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more
narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication.”).
68. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule that has
emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement.”).
69. See id. (stating that first a person must “have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy”).
70. See id. (“[S]econd . . . the expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
71. See id. at 357 (stating that searches conducted without a warrant are per se
unreasonable “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 573–74 (citing “third party
doctrine” and applying it to IP addresses); see, e.g., Note, Everybody’s Going Surfing: The
Third Circuit Approves the Warrantless Use of Internet Tracking Devices in United States v.
Stanley, 56 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 1, 5 (explaining that third party doctrine applies to
dialed phone numbers, as customers voluntarily transmit that information to phone
companies).
73. See id. at 574 (explaining “third party doctrine”); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (“[The Supreme Court] consistently has held that a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”).
74. See Christie, 624 F.3d at 573–74 (explaining that once information is “voluntarily
conveyed” to a third party, a person “assume[s] the risk” that information will be provided to
police); see also United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[B]y ‘revealing
his affairs to another,’ an individual ‘takes the risk . . . that the information will be conveyed
by that person to the Government.’” (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443
(1976))).
75. See Christie, 624 F.3d at 573–74 (discussing application of Katz reasonable
expectation test to IP addresses). In Christie, the FBI obtained administrative control of a
third party website offering illegal and obscene content. See id. at 563. Unlike in Lough, the
site was not hidden with Tor, therefore the FBI simply took the list of IP addresses that had
visited the site to the ISP and it matched the addresses with true identities. See id. See also,
United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding third party doctrine
applies and there is no expectation of privacy in IP address).
76. See Christie, 624 F.3d at 563 (explaining the process of assigning an IP address).
IP addresses are assigned by an ISP every time the user connects to the internet. See id.
“Depending on the ISP, a customer’s IP address can change each time he logs on to the
internet.” Id. Website administrators also have access to a list of IP addresses that have
visited their site, however they do not have access to the real names of the customers
possessing each IP address. See id.
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current law, an Internet user cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
an IP address because government agents can easily obtain that information
from the ISP.77
2.

The “Common-law Trespassory” Test

After over forty years of applying the Katz test, the Court shifted its
viewpoint again in Jones, where it seemingly resurrected the idea that a Fourth
Amendment search can also be tied to a “physical intrusion.”78 In Jones, the
FBI attached a GPS device to a suspect’s car and used it to track his
movements.79 The Court simplified the events of the case when it stated “[t]he
Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining
information,” and that it had “no doubt that such a physical intrusion would
have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
when it was adopted.”80 Although the Court agreed that citizens have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in their public locations, it reasoned that “the
officers in this case did more than conduct a visual inspection of the defendant’s
vehicle.”81 By reviving the physical intrusion concept, the Court made clear
that a full analysis for a Fourth Amendment search entails both the reasonable
expectation of privacy test and the physical intrusion test.82

77. See id. at 574 (“[N]o reasonable expectation of privacy exists in an IP address,
because that information is also conveyed to and, indeed, from third parties, including ISPs.”);
see also United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that subscribers
do not have subjective expectation of privacy in information conveyed to service providers
because they “assumed the risk” that information could be handed over to police); United
States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that information given to
an ISP is not protected by Fourth Amendment).
78. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408 (2012) (explaining that “Katz did not
narrow the Fourth Amendment’s scope,” but merely supplemented original physical intrusion
test).
79. See id. at 402–03 (explaining facts of the FBI investigation). From its position on
“the undercarriage” of the vehicle, the device could establish “the vehicle’s location within 50
to 100 feet.” See id. at 403. It “communicated that location by cellular phone to a
Government computer.” Id. The FBI secured a warrant authorizing it to attach the device
anywhere in the District of Columbia within ten days of securing the warrant. See id. at 402–
03. However, the FBI attached the GPS on the eleventh day in the state of Maryland,
violating the precise authorization of the warrant. See id. at 403. The district court “held the
data admissible, because ‘[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.’” See id. at
403 (quoting United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 88 (D.D.C. 2006)).
80. See id. at 404–05 (explaining its holding that Katz test is mere supplement to
original “common-law trespassory test”); see also New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 111
(1986) (finding that even intrusion as slight as an officer reaching his arm into a vehicle is
enough to constitute physical intrusion for Fourth Amendment purposes); see also, Thomas,
Stumbling Toward History: The Framers’ Search and Seizure World, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV.
199, 206-215 (2010) (describing the colonial history that influenced the Framers’
understanding of the Fourth Amendment).
81. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 410 (citation omitted) (distinguishing facts underlying Jones
from those in Class).
82. See id. at 411 (making clear that full analysis is a combination of two tests rather
than excluding one in favor of another). Justice Scalia, in response to criticism from the
concurrence wrote that unlike those in favor of using only the Katz analysis, “we do not make
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One obstacle facing the Supreme Court in reaching its conclusion in Jones
was a pair of cases dealing with the use of “beepers” to track drug-making
chemicals.83 In United States v. Knotts,84 the first of the two cases, law
enforcement officials placed a beeper inside a drum containing a chemical
precursor used to make illegal drugs.85 The Court ruled that there was no
reasonable expectation of privacy in public movements, so the fact that the
beeper was placed in the drum without the purchaser’s permission and used to
follow the suspect’s movements played no role in the analysis.86
In the second case, United States v. Karo,87 the Court stated that until the
beeper was used to monitor the suspect’s location, there was no infringement of
a privacy interest.88 In a nearly identical set of facts to Knotts, the law
enforcement officers in Karo placed a beeper into a drum used to store
chemicals before it was sold to a suspected drug manufacturer.89 While
acknowledging that the installation of the beeper was a trespass, the Court in
Karo ultimately held that it did not violate the Fourth Amendment.90
In the Jones opinion, Justice Scalia distinguished the installation of the
devices in Knotts and Karo from the installation of the GPS tracker on the
defendant’s Jeep.91 The notable difference in Jones was the fact that “the
Government trespassorily inserted the information-gathering device,” because
trespass the exclusive test.” See id.
83. See id. at 409–10 (distinguishing ruling from those of Knotts and Karo).
84. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
85. See id. at 277 (explaining that officers placed “beeper,” or radio transmitter, inside
of “five gallon drum containing chloroform purchased by” suspected drug manufacturer prior
to delivery of the chemicals). Officers installed the beeper while the container was in the
possession of the Hawkins Chemical Company. See id. at 278. The arrangement was such
that when the defendant placed the next order, the company would make sure his product was
placed in the drum containing the beeper. See id. Authorities used both the beeper as well as
visual surveillance to track the container to a cabin. See id. at 278–79.
86. See id. at 281 (comparing privacy in location to the “diminished” privacy in a
vehicle). “A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.” Id. The Court also
noted that it had “never equated police efficiency with unconstitutionality.” See id. at 284.
Essentially, the Court ruled that the beeper was just an extension of what was visible to the
public; anyone watching the movements of the vehicle carrying the drum would have known
the container was in the cabin. See id. at 285.
87. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
88. See id. at 712 (“The mere transfer to Karo of a can containing an unmonitored
beeper infringed no privacy interest. [The beeper] conveyed no information that Karo wished
to keep private, for it conveyed no information at all.”).
89. See id. at 708 (explaining that with consent from the chemical supplier, officers
replaced can of ether, intended for delivery to defendant, with container of their own holding a
beeper). Much like in Knotts, the government used the beeper to track the movements of the
can and eventually led to subsequent searches and arrests. See id. at 708–10.
90. See id. at 712–13 (“At most, there was a technical trespass on the space occupied
by the beeper. The existence of a physical trespass is only marginally relevant to the question
of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated . . . .”). The Karo court established that
the mere act of transferring to Karo a container with a beeper was not a Fourth Amendment
search. See id. at 712. It was not until the authorities began monitoring the beeper that a
potential for a violation was possible. See id.
91. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408–10 (2012) (summarizing holdings in
Knotts and Karo).
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the vehicle was in the defendant’s possession at the time of the installation.92 In
Knotts and Karo, however, the installation occurred before the containers were
in the defendant’s possession.93
Therefore, the seemingly inconsistent
conclusions between Jones and the two prior cases are reconcilable under the
physical intrusion test.94
C. Get off my Cyberlawn: Is Cybertrespass a Thing?
An emerging issue that plays a substantially important role in the
discussion of the NIT as a Fourth Amendment search is whether someone can
trespass in cyberspace, and many courts have held the digital transmission of
unwanted signals is enough to establish a trespass.95 Nevertheless, one
commenter finds it troubling for courts to be establishing the tort of
cybertrespass, worrying that it will stunt the free growth of the Internet.96 Yet,
another legal commenter argues that advances in cybertrespass law are
beneficial because advancements allow companies to protect their investments
in web-resources.97
Although Congress has not created a statute specifically defining the crime
of cybertrespass, it has criminalized the act of interfering with “protected

92. See id. (explaining that the difference lies in the time period of installation of
tracking devices).
93. See id. at 409 (explaining that in both cases a device was placed into container
while it was still in possession of the respective chemical distributor).
94. See id. at 410 (holding that because the Jeep was in defendant’s possession at the
time the GPS was attached, FBI had physically intruded into his property). Whereas in Knotts
and Karo, the government could not have intruded into defendants’ property as drums were
not in possession of defendants when devices were attached. See id.
95. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (holding that electronic signals are tangible enough to establish trespass action);
America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550–51 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that even
without physical damage to the computer, unwanted spam was still a trespass); CompuServe
Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (recognizing a
viable claim for trespass where defendant sent unwanted electronic signals to plaintiff’s
network); Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1566 (1996) (holding that it is
a trespass to “hack” into a computer system to make free long distance telephone calls);
Washington v. Riley, 846 P.2d 1365, 1373 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (“[A] person is guilty of
computer trespass in the first degree if the person, without authorization, intentionally gains
access to a computer system or electronic data base of another.” (quoting WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.52.110 (repealed 2016))).
96. See Edward W. Chang, Bidding on Trespass: eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc. and
the Abuse of Trespass Theory in Cyberspace-Law, 29 AIPLA Q.J. 445, 446 (2001) (arguing
that unbridled expansion of cybertrespass law is dangerous). Chang was particularly
concerned with the idea that in eBay, the court allowed for minimal damage or use to be
sufficient to support an action for trespass. See id. at 462–64; see also eBay, Inc., 100 F.
Supp. 2d at 1071 (holding that even though the defendant used a very small percentage of
plaintiff’s resources, it still committed actionable trespass).
97. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (2003)
(advocating for an even more liberal set of cybertrespass laws). Epstein states that he believes
cybertrespass should develop to mirror the law of real property. See id. at 82–83. His
reasoning is that cyber entities are “fixed” in their cyber locations just as real property is fixed
to its position on land. See id. at 83. This would mean that plaintiffs would not be required to
show any real damage at all in order to state a sufficient cybertrespass claim. See id. at 78.
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computers” through the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).98 Under the
CFAA, it is illegal to access a computer for the purpose of obtaining
information without permission.99 While the CFAA has been criticized for
being overly broad, it sends a signal to courts that Congress considers
unauthorized computer access to be a serious offense.100
III. DOWNLOAD COMPLETE: THE FBI’S PLAYPEN STING
The Lough case, and its many companions, stem from a common nucleus
of facts surrounding an FBI sting of a child pornography website.101 In
December 2014, the FBI learned that a child pornography website was
operating on the Tor network under the name “Playpen.”102 Due to the masking
process of the Tor software, the FBI struggled to locate the server running the
website.103 However, on February 20, 2015, the FBI was able to seize the
server hosting Playpen from a web-hosting facility in North Carolina.104 Rather
than disabling Playpen and permanently removing it from the Dark Web, the
FBI continued operating the website for thirteen days.105
The seizure of Playpen and the arrest of its owner allowed the FBI to
assume administrative control over the website.106 Even though FBI agents
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012) (criminalizing certain uses of computers by government
and in interstate commerce).
99. See id. § 1030(a)(2)(c) (“[It is a crime to] intentionally access a computer without
authorization or [when authorization is exceeded], and thereby obtain[] . . . information from
any protected computer”).
100. See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1568 (2010) (examining the criticisms of the definition of “protected
computer”). Under the act any computer in interstate commerce is “protected” and in reality
every computer is engaged in interstate commerce. See id.
101. See United States v. Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 770, 772 (N.D. W. Va. 2016)
(explaining that Playpen was used as a means for unsavory individuals to look at, share, and
download child pornography).
102. See id. (explaining that Playpen was operated in secrecy of the Tor network where
users could hide from law enforcement by masking their true identities and IP addresses). In
order to access Playpen, users needed to sign in using a username and password. See id. at
773. The site had approximately 215,000 members, of which the NIT was deployed against
1,300. See Nakashima, supra note 1 (discussing Playpen sting and government’s use of
malware to identify child pornography offenders).
103. See United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920, 925–26 (W.D. Ark. 2016)
(explaining that, due to complete anonymity of Tor network, there was no way for the FBI to
identify or locate site’s operator).
104. See id. at 925 (“[T]he FBI received a serendipitous break [in its search for the
Playpen owner].”). While the site was going through an update, the owner of the site
mistakenly deactivated the Tor cloaking settings. See id. This left the Playpen site exposed
for “a few days.” See id. The deactivated settings opened a window wide enough for the FBI
to find the server that was hosting Playpen. See id. After seizing the server, the FBI arrested
the site’s owner on February 19, 2015. See id.
105. See id. at 926; see also Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 773 (explaining that FBI
continued to administer site in order to identify users who were involved with abuse of
children). Playpen was kept open from February 20, 2015 until March 4, 2015. See Jean, 207
F. Supp. 3d at 926. To accomplish this task, “agents made a copy of the Playpen website,”
placed it on a government server, and assumed administrative control over it. See id.
106. See Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 925–26 (restating the process by which FBI gained
control of Playpen).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018

13

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 6 [2018], Art. 5

114

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE [Vol. 63: p. 101

working the case became the administrators of the website, due to the Tor
network they had no way of identifying visitors.107 In order to solve the
dilemma, the FBI created a piece of software, the NIT, and obtained a federal
warrant to deploy it.108
The NIT was deployed when a website visitor “clicked on a forum link to
begin downloading child pornography.”109 The NIT would then “surreptitiously
deploy” and force the “activating computer” to send certain identifying
information to the FBI.110 In addition to the computer’s IP address, the NIT
relayed to the FBI the type of operating system used by the computer, the
computer’s “Host Name,” and the computer’s media access control (MAC)
address.111
The defendant in Lough was one of many to have accessed Playpen while it
was under the FBI’s control.112 His IP address was revealed when the FBI
deployed the NIT against his computer.113 To obtain the defendant’s actual
identification, the FBI subpoenaed his ISP.114 Using the information from the
NIT and the ISP, the FBI obtained a search warrant authorizing agents to search

107. See id. at 926 (“The users’ identifying information was purposely unknown to
Playpen’s owner, and the users’ IP addresses remained concealed because the website was
only accessible as a hidden service on the TOR network, thus providing total anonymity to the
users.”).
108. See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 772–73 (describing the process used by the FBI to
obtain a NIT warrant). For the purposes of this Note, the fact that the FBI actually obtained a
warrant makes no difference; the Lough court concluded that one was not needed because the
NIT was not a Fourth Amendment search. See id. at 775–76. The judge that issued the
warrant was a federal magistrate judge from the Eastern District of Virginia. See id. at 776;
Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 926. Much of the controversy regarding the warrant stems from the
fact that it applied to “searches” across the country and outside the jurisdiction of the
magistrate judge. See Nakashima, supra note 1. An attorney representing a defendant similar
to Lough, stated, “There has never been any warrant . . . that allows searches on that scale. It
is unprecedented.” See id.
109. See Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 927 (explaining that to deploy the NIT numerous
affirmative actions were necessary, including logging into the Playpen website using a
username and password and clicking on forum to begin download). The NIT and the illegal
content would download simultaneously. See id. at 928.
110. See id. at 928 (explaining that entire process of transmitting information occurred
before child pornography had even completed its download). The NIT worked “by exploiting
a defective window in the TOR browser, through which it ran what amounts to malware on
the user’s computer.” Id. at 927 (footnote omitted). This process is what forced the computer
to return information to the FBI. See id. at 928.
111. See id. at 926 (stating that although this information allowed the FBI to obtain
identifying information about suspect’s computer, they were not given any information about
the suspects “true identity” in physical world). For efficiency purposes the NIT also
generated a “unique identifier” each time it was deployed and kept track of whether or not the
NIT had been previously deployed on the particular “activating computer.” See id.
112. See Nakashima, supra note 1 (stating that over 130 persons have been charged in
relation to Playpen sting).
113. See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 773 (“Utilizing the NIT, the FBI determined that a
user living in Fairmont, West Virginia, with the username ‘2tots,’ had logged into the Playpen
website and accessed child pornography.”).
114. See id. (“An administrative subpoena served on Frontier Communications
Corporation [the ISP] established that the IP address for ‘2tots’ belonged to Lough’s account,
which was registered to a street address later determined to belong to him.”).
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the defendant’s home.115 On March 23, 2016, the defendant pled guilty to child
pornography charges but later moved to withdraw the plea.116 In September
2016, the defendant moved to suppress all evidence that resulted from the NIT
warrant.117 After carefully considering the arguments presented by the parties,
the court concluded that a discussion of the warrant was not necessary to the
court’s determination because the NIT did not constitute a search under the
Fourth Amendment.118
IV. NO HIDING BEHIND A KEYBOARD: THE LOUGH COURT CONCLUDES IP
ADDRESS IS PUBLIC INFORMATION
To determine whether the evidence stemming from the NIT should be
suppressed, the Lough court first had to determine whether the NIT constituted
a search under the Fourth Amendment.119 In analyzing this question, the court
115. See id. (stating that the FBI secured a warrant to raid the suspect’s home and that
after the raid, agents seized “multiple pieces of evidence suspected of containing child
pornography”).
116. See id. (recounting that Lough waived his right of indictment, “acknowledged the
facts” presented by the FBI agent, and admitted to charges). On May 4, 2016, Lough moved
to withdraw the plea after learning of another court that had suppressed evidence stemming
from the NIT. See id.
117. See id. (explaining rationale for Lough’s motion). Lough argued that the evidence
must be excluded because the warrant was invalid. See id. The government argued that the
warrant was valid as the NIT acted as a tracking device. See id. Magistrate judges are
allowed to authorize the installation of a tracking device in their own district, even if the
subject then leaves the district of installation. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(4) (“[A] magistrate
judge . . . has authority to issue a warrant to install within the district a tracking device; the
warrant may authorize use of the device to track the movement of a person or property located
within the district, outside the district, or both[.]”). Many courts, including Lough and some
of its companions, have concluded that Rule 41(b)(4) gave the magistrate judge in Virginia
the power to authorize the NIT warrant, even though the IP address would be transmitted from
states outside the magistrate’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 777
(“[B]ecause the NIT is analogous to a tracking device in both function and effect, the
magistrate judge was authorized under Rule 41(b)(4) to issue a warrant for its use.”); see also
United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920, 937–38 (W.D. Ark. 2016) (holding that because
NIT “was an electronic tool or technique designed and executed for the purpose of tracking
the movement of information” warrant was authorized under Rule 41(b)(4)); United States v.
Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 4208436, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8,
2016) (“The fact that courts are presently divided over whether the NIT Warrant even violated
Rule 41 is compelling evidence that the FBI did not intentionally and deliberately violate that
Rule by seeking the warrant in the first instance.”); United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d
520, 536 (E.D. Va. 2016) (holding that because “[u]sers of Playpen digitally touched down in
the Eastern District of Virginia when they logged into the site” NIT acted as a tracking device
and is authorized under Rule 41(b)(4)); United States v. Eure, No. 2:16cr43, 2016 WL
4059663, at *9 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2016) (“Even if the FBI agents had some indication that the
warrant might exceed the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge, there were credible arguments
that the current rule allowed this warrant.”). But see United States v. Weredene, 188 F. Supp.
3d 431, 447 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (concluding that NIT software was “attached” in defendant’s
state which was outside of magistrate’s jurisdiction, but that error was too minor to require
suppression).
118. See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d. at 782–83 (concluding that defendant had no
reasonable expectation in IP address so warrant was unnecessary, but also concluding that the
warrant was valid even if required).
119. See id. at 774 (“The initial question presented here is whether Lough had the kind
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solely applied the Katz reasonable expectation test.120 As mentioned above, the
Katz test requires that the individual has a subjective expectation of privacy and
that the subjective expectation be one that society is prepared to accept.121
Specifically, the court stated that, for the defendant’s suppression motion to be
granted, he must have demonstrated a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
IP address sent to the FBI by the NIT.122
Under the first subjective prong of the Katz test, the court determined that
the defendant could not have had a subjective expectation of privacy due to the
third party doctrine.123 The court noted that while the defendant wished to
remain anonymous using the Tor network, hoping to remain anonymous is not
equal to expecting it.124 Because the IP address had been communicated to
numerous computers in the Tor chain, Lough could not have had a subjective
expectation of privacy in the IP address.125
After the defendant did not satisfy the first prong of the Katz test, the
analysis could have concluded.126 However, the court went on to explain that
even if Lough had demonstrated a legitimate subjective expectation, he would
not have passed the objective prong of the Katz test.127 The court noted that
every federal court that has discussed the issue of privacy in IP addresses has
of reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address that society is prepared to recognize.”).
The court also discussed whether the specific warrant authorizing the NIT was sufficient to
conduct a search. See id. at 774–75. In its opinion, the court also noted that “the vast
majority of courts addressing [this] issue have found suppression unwarranted.” See id. at
774.
120. See id. at 775 (stating the requirement for a defendant to demonstrate a reasonable
expectation of privacy). Although the Lough court does not cite directly to Katz, it is clear
that they were applying the test. See id. (explaining the need for both a subjective and
objective expectation of privacy).
121. See id. (explaining that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in an IP address and refraining from analyzing whether society would recognize this
expectation of privacy). The court also defined “objectively reasonable” to mean one “‘that
society is willing to recognize as reasonable.’” See id. (citing United States v. Castellanos,
716 F.3d 828, 832 (4th Cir. 2013)); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan,
J., concurring) (enunciating two prongs of the reasonable expectation test). For a further
discussion of Katz, see supra notes 62-77 and accompanying text.
122. See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 775 (“Absent a legitimate expectation of privacy,
Lough cannot invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment.”). The court concluded that
Lough cannot meet this expectation test for his IP address. See id.
123. See id. (“Lough could not have had a subjective expectation of privacy because he
voluntarily turned over his IP address to every computer with which he made contact,
including the first node of the TOR network.”).
124. See id. (stating explicitly that, although the defendant “hoped that the TOR would
facilitate” anonymity, “hoping and wishing are not the equivalent of expecting a certain
result”). The court stated, “At the very least, Lough certainly knew that he was revealing his
IP address to one unknown third party who, for all he knew, was a law enforcement officer.”
Id. (footnote omitted).
125. See id. (holding that because Lough had revealed “his affairs to another he t[ook]
the risk that” the “information will be conveyed by that person to the Government”) (quoting
United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016)).
126. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361–62 (explaining that subjective expectation must be
established first and if one does not exist then the analysis ends there).
127. See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 775 (“Even assuming that Lough did have a
subjective expectation of privacy, it is not one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.” (citation omitted)).
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concluded there is no objective expectation of privacy in them.128
The Lough court recognized that individuals certainly have a privacy
interest in items inside their homes, such as their computer and its contents.129
However, the court distinguished Lough’s privacy interest in his computer and
its contents from his lack of a privacy interest in his computer’s IP address.130
Thus, the court determined that because the computer’s contents were not
searched by the NIT, there was no Fourth Amendment search with respect to
the defendant’s computer.131 Having concluded that neither the IP address nor
other information gathered by the NIT constituted a search, the court denied
Lough’s motion to suppress the evidence stemming from the NIT.132
By determining that there was no Fourth Amendment search, the court
ruled that no warrant was necessary to utilize the NIT.133 Nevertheless, the
court examined the validity of the warrant authorizing the NIT.134 The court
determined that because the NIT was, for all intents and purposes, a tracking
device, the issuing magistrate had authority to supply the FBI with the warrant
used to implement the NIT.135 In coming to its conclusion, the court analogized
the way users visited the Playpen website to physically traveling to the location
of the FBI-run server, where agents then virtually attached the tracking

128. See id. at 775–76 (citing United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir.
2010)).
Even if the defendant could show that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in
his subscriber information, such an expectation would not be objectively
reasonable. Indeed, “every federal court to address this issue has held that
subscriber information provided to an internet provider is not protected by the
Fourth Amendment’s privacy expectation.”
Bynum, 604 F.3d at 164 (quoting United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir.
2008)).
129. See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 776 (“Clearly, Lough does have a privacy interest
in his home and its contents, including his computer.”).
130. See id. (distinguishing between the search of the contents of the defendant’s
computer and the FBI’s use of the NIT to identify the IP address of defendant’s computer and
concluding that the former gave rise to a privacy interest while latter did not).
131. See id. (citing United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 433 (4th Cir. 2016))
(noting clear distinction made between content-based communications and non-content
information and concluding that the NIT did not conduct search of contents of defendant’s
computer).
132. See id. at 783 (“Lough had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address,
nor did the NIT constitute a Fourth Amendment search of the content of his computer; thus, a
warrant was unnecessary; . . . Accordingly, the Court denies Lough’s motion to suppress.”).
133. See id. (determining that warrant was unnecessary where defendant had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in IP address and where there was no search of defendant’s
computer).
134. See id. at 776–78 (analyzing validity of warrant and explaining the defendant’s
contention was that the warrant exceeded the scope of the issuing magistrate’s authority, but
concluding that the nature of NIT allowed the magistrate to have authorized its use).
135. See id. at 777 (“Nevertheless, because the NIT is analogous to a tracking device in
both function and effect, the magistrate judge was authorized under Rule 41(b)(4) to issue a
warrant for its use.”). The court also noted that the companion case of Jean “tallied the courts
that have specifically addressed whether the NIT was akin to a tracking device.” See id.
Many of the tallied courts have used the analogy of a “virtual trip” to determine the NIT is the
functional equivalent of a tracking device. See id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 6 [2018], Art. 5

118

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE [Vol. 63: p. 101

device—the NIT—to a user’s “vehicle.”136 Thus, the NIT was a tracking device
authorized by a legal warrant.137
V. ERROR, INCOMPLETE DISC: COMPLETING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
SEARCH ANALYSIS
While many courts have come to similar conclusions regarding the NIT—
and these conclusions may not necessarily be incorrect—the Lough court did
not complete the Fourth Amendment search analysis prescribed in Jones.138
The full determination of a search should have included both the Katz
reasonableness test and the Jones physical intrusion test.139 Had the Lough
court completed this analysis, it very well may have come to the conclusion that
the NIT was in fact a search protected by the Fourth Amendment.140
Additionally, companion cases suggest that the issue of whether there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy in IP addresses could have been decided in
favor of the defendant in Lough.141 If examined under both the Katz and Jones
136. See id. at 778 (agreeing with and following other courts’ “virtual trip” analogy).
The court stated:
Lough took a virtual trip to the Eastern District of Virginia, but rather than travel by
car, he traveled digitally—his vehicle was comprised of packets of information.
Once there, the FBI attached a digital electronic tracking device to those packets,
which Lough virtually rode back to the Northern District of West Virginia. Upon
his virtual return, Lough parked his digital vehicle built of those packets of
information on his computer, rather than in his driveway. At that point, the NIT
sent back his digital address, just as a GPS tracker would send back his coordinates.
Id.
137. See id. (“Accordingly, the NIT is analogous to a tracking device . . . and the NIT
warrant is an information-tracking warrant that comports with [the law], which [the
magistrate] had the authority to issue.”).
138. See id. at 775 (holding that because Lough had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in information taken by the malware, NIT was not a search); United States v. Jean,
207 F. Supp. 3d 920, 933 (W.D. Ark. 2016) (“[T]he FBI in the instant case was under no legal
obligation to obtain a search warrant . . . as IP addresses are unlikely to be entitled to the same
Fourth Amendment protections as are the substantive contents of users’ computers.”); United
States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 4208436, at *4 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 8, 2016) (proclaiming that NIT was not a search); United States v. Eure, No. 2:16cr43,
2016 WL 4059663, at *9 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2016) (holding that “searches and seizures
perform[ed] pursuant to the NIT did not violate Fourth Amendment”); United States v.
Weredene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 444 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (holding that Weredene’s computer was
not searched because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address).
139. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (explaining that the Katz test
does not supersede the “physical intrusion” test, rather it supplemented it). The Court stated,
“Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.” Id.
140. See United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 530 (E.D. Va. 2016) (holding
that NIT is search because “government literally . . . invaded the contents of the computer”);
see also United States v. Torres, No. 5:16-CR-285-DAE, 2016 WL 4821223, at *3 (W.D. Tex.
Sept. 9, 2016) (holding NIT was “unquestionably a ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes”
because it “placed code on [the] computer without [the defendant’s] permission”). Although
these two Lough companion cases do not explicitly analyze the situation under the Jones test,
both seem to use the idea of a physical intrusion to label the NIT a search. See Torres, 2016
WL 4821223, at *3; Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 530.
141. See, e.g., United States v. Ammons, 207 F. Supp. 3d 732, 739 (W.D. Ky. 2016)
(holding that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and that the third party doctrine does
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tests, the NIT should be considered a search under the Fourth Amendment.142
A. The NIT Is a Search Under the Katz Test
While the majority of courts have determined that IP addresses are subject
to the third party doctrine, there is evidence that the third party doctrine may not
apply to the specific facts of Lough.143 Indeed, at least one court challenges this
idea by distinguishing between the government’s retrieval of information
directly from the defendant using surveillance or an invasive technique and the
government’s retrieval of the information from some business or other third
party.144 For example, when the government obtains records from a business
via subpoena, there is an inherent decrease, or even elimination, of the privacy
interest.145 Thus, if under Katz the defendant’s reasonable expectation of
privacy depends on how the government retrieved the information at issue, then
it follows that information retrieved from a third party loses the expectation of
privacy, whereas information retrieved using an invasive technique does not.146
The Lough court concluded that the FBI’s use of the NIT fell within the
third party doctrine of the Fourth Amendment because the defendant had
provided his IP address to both his ISP and to other nodes on the Tor
network.147 However, the NIT pulled the IP address and related information
directly from the suspect’s computer.148 The FBI did not gain access to this

not apply here because the FBI did not obtain IP address from third party but from computer
itself).
142. See id. (applying Katz and finding NIT to be Fourth Amendment search); see also
Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 528, 530 (finding a Fourth Amendment search due to apparent
government intrusion in the context of a Jones discussion).
143. Cf. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Whether a
defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in certain information depends in part on
what the government did to get it.”). In Carpenter, the court noted a distinction between
police accidentally overhearing a phone conversation in a public place (not protected by the
Fourth Amendment) and using a wiretap to hear that same conversation (protected by the
Fourth Amendment). See id.
144. See id. at 889 (highlighting two ends of the Fourth Amendment spectrum and
noting that information collected from third parties is on one end and is unprotected by the
Fourth Amendment, while information retrieved by government from suspect via some
surveillance or other invasive technique is on the other end).
145. See id. (“[B]usiness records obtained from a third party . . . can only diminish the
defendants’ privacy in the information those records contain.” (citations omitted)).
146. See id. at 888–89 (distinguishing Jones from Carpenter and concluding that,
while there was reasonable expectation of privacy in Jones, there was no such expectation in
Carpenter). The court stated, “[T]he government action in this case is very different from the
government action in Jones. That distinction matters: in applying Katz, ‘it is important to
begin by specifying precisely the nature of the state activity that is challenged.’” Id. at 888
(emphasis in original).
147. See United States v. Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 770, 775 (N.D. W. Va. 2016)
(explaining that the third party doctrine applies to those who expose their information to
others and assume risk that this information may be turned over to government and finding it
applied here because Lough gave his IP address to every computer with which he made
contact).
148. See United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920, 926 (W.D. Ark. 2016) (describing
that NIT deployed secretly on “activating computer” and sent information directly to FBI).
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information by subpoenaing the ISP or the other Tor users.149 Indeed, the point
of using the NIT was to obtain the IP addresses without going to some source
other than the suspects themselves; moreover, the FBI could not have retrieved
the IP addresses from any third party because the third party would not have
been able to undo the camouflage created by Tor.150
Even one of Lough’s companion cases, decided a few months earlier,
concluded that defendants subjected to the NIT had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their IP addresses and computers.151 While conceding that
individuals generally have no expectation of privacy in their IP addresses, the
companion court noted that the FBI obtained the IP address from the
defendant’s personal computer rather than from an ISP.152 The real question,
according to the companion court, was whether defendants have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their private computers.153 Generally, courts have
concluded that they clearly do.154 Through this lens, the companion court
concluded that implementing the NIT and forcing code upon the defendant’s
computer violated a reasonable expectation of privacy; thus, under the Katz test
alone, the NIT was a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.155
Even if the companion court’s conclusion was incorrect, at least one
Supreme Court Justice has recently called for an evolution of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence to correspond with the new digital age.156 In her
concurrence in Jones, Justice Sotomayor acknowledged that America’s search
and seizure jurisprudence is outdated and that people’s expectations of privacy
149. See id. (explaining that “[t]he users’ identifying information was purposely
unknown to Playpen’s owner, and the users’ IP addresses remained concealed because the
website was only accessible as a hidden service on the TOR network,” thus, the FBI could not
have gone to an ISP to get the IP addresses as they had no way of knowing who they were
targeting).
150. See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 772–73 (stating the FBI created the NIT for the
purpose of obtaining information about those persons accessing the website).
151. See United States v. Ammons, 207 F. Supp. 3d 732, 739 (W.D. Ky. 2016) (“There
appears to be no dispute that Ammons enjoyed a subjective expectation of privacy in the
contents of his personal computer. His expectation was reasonable too.” (citation omitted)).
152. See id. (noting that warrant listed the defendant’s computer as things to be
searched). The Ammons court appears to change the analysis from examining the IP address
to examining the expectation defendants have in their computers. See id. By reframing the
issue, the court easily determined that the third party doctrine did not apply because the
defendant did not share his computer with a service provider—he only shared his IP address—
and the NIT searched his computer. See id.
153. See id. (“The Government elides the fact that the NIT warrant describes Ammons’
computer as the thing to be searched . . . . Accordingly, the pertinent inquiry is whether
Ammons had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his personal computer—
not merely in his IP address.” (citations omitted)).
154. See id. (“Generally speaking, computer users have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in data stored on a home computer.” (citing Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir.
2001))).
155. See id. (concluding that the NIT was a search under the Katz test because it
intruded on the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy); see also United States v.
Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 529–30 (E.D. Va. 2016) (holding that placing code on a
defendant’s computer constituted search).
156. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”).
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have likely changed over time.157 Justice Sotomayor advocated for decoupling
secrecy and privacy when it comes to the Fourth Amendment.158 Just because
something is publicly available does not mean society would be willing to
accept that there is no privacy interest in it.159 Unfortunately for the defendants
whose IP addresses are obtained via NIT , such an evolution of the law has not
occurred to date, and the Lough court’s interpretation of Katz appears to be the
prevailing view.160
B. The NIT Is a Search Under the Jones Test
Even while giving deference to the Lough court’s conclusion with regard to
the Katz test, it is still possible to conclude that the NIT was search.161
Although none of Lough’s companion cases explicitly cite to Jones, their
reasoning indicates that the idea of a physical intrusion played a role in their
decisions.162 Despite the fact that the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones
incorporated the physical intrusion test into any Fourth Amendment search
analysis, the Lough court relied solely on the Katz test.163
The Lough court should have inquired whether the NIT constituted a
physical intrusion of the defendant’s computer.164 Interestingly, the court
157.
See id. at 417–18 (noting “people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks” and “doubt[ing] that
people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list
of every web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year.”).
158. See id. at 418 (“[W]hatever the societal expectations, they can attain
constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat
secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy.”).
159. See id. (“I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some
member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth
Amendment protection.” (citation omitted)).
160. See United States v. Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 770, 774-76 (N.D. W. Va. 2016)
(noting that the opinion is guided by “the vast majority of courts” that have addressed similar
issues and found suppression of NIT evidence unwarranted).
161. See United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 530 (E.D. Va. 2016) (noting that
the placement of code on the defendant’s computer constitutes a government intrusion and
thus, a Fourth Amendment search). The Darby court also noted that it is irrelevant that some
of the information seized lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy. See id.
162. See id. (“In placing code on Defendant’s computer, the government literally . . .
invaded the contents of the computer. Additionally, the code . . . caused Defendant’s
computer to transmit certain information without the authority or knowledge of Defendant.”);
see also United States v. Torres, No. 5:16-CR-285-DAE, 2016 WL 4821223, at *3 (W.D. Tex.
Sept. 9, 2016) (“[T]he NIT placed code on [the] computer without [defendant’s]
permission . . . [thus, the NIT] was unquestionably a ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment
purposes.”).
163. See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 775–76 (analyzing a Fourth Amendment search using
only a reasonable expectation of privacy test and without any discussion of whether the NIT
was a physical intrusion); see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 407 (majority opinion) (“Katz did not
erode the principle ‘that, when the Government does engage in physical intrusion of a
constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.’” (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286
(1983) (Brennan, J., concurring))).
164. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (holding that physical intrusions are considered
searches for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment). In Jones, the installation and use of
GPS was deemed a search because “[t]he Government physically occupied private property
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displayed this type of reasoning when it described the NIT as a tracking device
and used the “virtual trip” analogy.165 In analogizing the installation and use of
the NIT to that of a GPS tracker, the court should have realized the factual
similarities to Jones, as well as Knotts and Karo.166 In these cases, as well as in
Lough, the government affixed a device for the purpose of obtaining
information.167 While this action did not constitute a search in Knotts and Karo,
it did in Jones.168
Importantly, the facts of Lough are more similar to Jones than to Knotts
and Karo.169 In Lough, the NIT was virtually placed on the defendant’s
computer without his knowledge or consent, and the computer was inside of his
home when this occurred.170 Unlike the facts in Knotts and Karo, Lough’s
computer was in his possession when the government affixed its “tracking
device” to it.171 Companion cases of Lough indicated that the FBI’s placement
of malware onto a computer without the owner’s permission equates to a
physical intrusion, even if they do not explicitly state that conclusion.172
for the purpose of obtaining information.” See id.
165. See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 778 (comparing the NIT to a GPS tracker). The
court in Lough likened the defendant’s visit to Playpen to him taking a trip via car. See id.
Much like in Jones, where the FBI attached a GPS to a defendant’s Jeep, in Lough the FBI
attached the NIT to the defendant’s virtual vehicle. See id.; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 403.
The Lough court analogized the transmission of the IP address to the transmission of location
data from a GPS. See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 778. Thus, the court concluded, the NIT was
akin to a GPS tracker. See id.
166. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 403 (stating that police affixed a GPS tracker to the
defendant’s vehicle and that this practice constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment);
see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984) (explaining that in order to track
movements of suspected drug manufacturer, police obtained permission from the chemical
distributor to swap a drum of ether with a drum bugged with a beeper); Knotts, 460 U.S. at
278–79 (1983) (explaining that law enforcement officials placed a radio transmitter inside of a
chemical drum, while in possession of the chemical distributor, in order to track the
movements of suspected drug manufacturers).
167. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 712 (describing the installation of a beeper inside the can of
ether); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278 (describing installation of beeper inside five-gallon container
of chloroform).
168. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 409–10 (differentiating itself from Knotts and Karo due to
the fact that in the beeper cases, potential intrusions occurred before property was held by
defendants, while in Jones the vehicle the government bugged was owned and in possession
of the defendant); see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 712 (holding that beeper’s placement did not
infringe a privacy interest); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (holding that the act of installing a beeper
into a vat of chemicals is not in itself a search).
169. See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 773 (describing the process used by the NIT to
transfer the data); see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 409–10 (differentiating itself from Knotts and
Karo because the government bugged item that was owned and in possession of the
defendant).
170. See id. at 773, 778 (explaining that the NIT was transmitted from FBI
headquarters directly onto defendant’s computer and that under the court’s “virtual trip”
analogy neither defendant nor his computer actually left his home in West Virginia).
171. See id. at 778 (stating defendant’s computer never left his house, thus creating
“virtual trip” analogy); see Karo, 468 U.S. at 708 (explaining that the beeper was placed into a
container belonging to law enforcement who then swapped it with one set to be purchased by
defendant); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278 (stating that the beeper was installed while the container
was in possession of the chemical company).
172. See United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 530 (E.D. Va. 2016) (noting that
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Perhaps the reason courts have been reluctant to apply the physical
intrusion test to the NIT is the fact that the intrusion occurred digitally.173 Yet,
in Jones, Justice Scalia noted that the intrusion test has always been tied to the
law of trespass.174 Although the Supreme Court may be slow to react when it
comes to technology, numerous courts have expanded trespass into the cyber
realm.175
Electronic signals appear to be enough to establish a cybertrespass, and the
threshold requirement of damage or occupation is minimal.176 The concept of
Cybertrespass suggests that the FBI physically intrudes into a defendant’s
computer by sending an unwanted signal occupying a small portion of a
defendant’s hard drive space.177 As it applies to Lough, by combining the
notions that a cybertrespass requires a very small amount of storage to be
occupied and that a physical intrusion can be as minimal as an officer reaching
into a vehicle, it can be argued that the implementation of the NIT without the
computer owner’s permission would constitute a Fourth Amendment search.178
the government literally intruded into defendant’s computer by placing code there without
permission); see also United States v. Torres, No. 5:16-CR-285-DAE, 2016 WL 4821223, at
*3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2016) (holding that by installing the NIT without permission, the
government “unquestionably” committed Fourth Amendment search and seizure).
173. Cf. Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 773 (explaining that information secured by the NIT
was transferred to FBI via internet).
174. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (acknowledging a close
connection between property law and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). Justice Scalia
wrote,
The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close connection to property, since
otherwise it would have referred simply to “the right of the people to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures”; the phrase “in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects” would have been superfluous.
Consistent with this
understanding, our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law
trespass . . . .
Id. (citations omitted)
175. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (holding that electronic signals are enough to establish trespass action); America
Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550–51 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that even without
physical damage to computer, unwanted spam still trespass); CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber
Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding these is a viable claim
for trespass when the defendant sends unwanted electronic signals to the plaintiff’s network);
Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1566 (1996) (holding that it is a trespass
to “hack” into computer system to make free long distance telephone calls); Washington v.
Riley, 846 P.2d 1365 (Wash. 1993) (“[A] person is guilty of computer trespass in the first
degree if the person, without authorization, intentionally gains access to a computer system or
electronic data base of another[.]” (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.52.110 (repealed 2016))).
176. See eBay, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1071 (holding that even a very small percentage
of unauthorized usage constitutes trespass because it is still use of another person’s property).
But see Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 309, 312 (Cal. 2003) (holding that some level of
actual damage to a computer system is necessary to establish cause of action for trespass).
177. Cf. United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920, 928 (W.D. Ark. 2016) (noting that
the NIT downloaded and did its job so quickly that it would have been unnoticeable by the
owner of computer); see also Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 79-82
(2003) (explaining the idea of trespass in the digital realm).
178. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 111 (1986) (stating that even very small
physical intrusions can constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment); Lough, 221 F.
Supp. 3d at 773 (describing how the FBI deployed NIT on Lough’s computer without his
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VI. LOGGING OFF: IMPACT AND MORE QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

The digital age has revolutionized the way the world does business, learns,
communicates, and thinks; this technological boom has been less effective in
forcing a legal evolution.179 Indeed, as Justice Sotomayor stressed in her
concurring opinion in Jones, it is critical that courts be willing to adapt their
understanding of the Fourth Amendment to new technologies or they risk
becoming antiquated.180 Specifically, the analysis under Katz likely requires
reconsideration of what society truly expects in terms of online privacy.181 This
area of law is a new frontier, and the decisions made by courts like Lough will
determine the way lawyers and government agents interact with the
Constitution, thus changing the way the world operates.182
It is important to note that, although Lough failed to consider the Jones
Fourth Amendment test, it does not necessarily mean the NIT violated the
Constitution.183 Indeed, Lough and the majority of its companions found that
the warrant used to authorize the NIT was sufficient.184 Thus, although the NIT
was a search, it was a warranted one.185
Yet, the prospect of these types of “mass warrants” is still frightening to
those concerned with protecting individual liberties.186 One fear is that law
enforcement tools like the NIT are a slippery slope; if the FBI can forcibly place
code on a person’s computer, what else can it do?187 The FBI has attempted to
knowledge); eBay, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1071 (setting the amount of resource use necessary
for cybertrespass is very low).
179. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (holding just three years ago
that cellphones were categorically different than other types of information containers, such as
cigarette packets); see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 418 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (expressing
that the Supreme Court may need to update its thinking with regard to Fourth Amendment
search analysis in order to keep pace with the evolution of technology and its interaction with
society).
180. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 418 (expressing “doubt that people would accept without
complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every web site they had
visited”).
181. See id. at 418 (“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.
This approach is ill suited for the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”
(citations omitted)).
182. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text (explaining that the United States
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the physical world is well defined, but
digital world jurisprudence in nearly non-existent).
183. See Lough, 221 F. Supp. at 778 (finding that the warrant authorizing NIT was
sufficient); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing protections against warrantless
searches and seizures).
184. See United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920, 938 (W.D. Ark. 2016) (tallying
numerous Lough companion cases finding the warrant to have been adequate to authorize
NIT).
185. See Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 778 (comparing the NIT to a GPS tracker and
concluding that the NIT warrant complied with federal law).
186. See Nakashima, supra note 1 (“As the hacking techniques become more
ambitious, failure in execution can lead to large-scale privacy and civil liberties abuses at
home and abroad.”).
187. See id. (expressing concern about NIT’s future impact).
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quell these concerns by stating the NIT is only to be used against those taking
actions to download child pornography; therefore, it would be highly unlikely
for a truly innocent person to come into contact with the NIT.188 Nevertheless,
in a post-Snowden world, it is all too common for the public to harbor distrust
of covert government actions.189

188. See id. (“[T]he bureau recognizes that the use of an NIT is ‘intrusive’ and should
only be deployed ‘in the most serious cases.’ [The quoted FBI agent] said the FBI uses the
tool only against offenders who are ‘the worst of the worst.’”).
189. See NPR Staff, supra note 42 (explaining that Tor usage increased after
Snowden’s revelation of NSA techniques).
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